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The existing child protection laws in China do allow for abusive parents （）of their custody rights, but they do not include details on implementation.

The Stoics and the Epicureans, however （）in the rest of their systems, agreed in holding themselves bound to prove that their respective maxims of conduct were the dictates of nature.

Many an institution has been set up to try and make sense of the inscrutable nature of us human beings, and although （）, it is only instrumental in showing how little we really understand.

The conference’s participants were also under no illusion about what was （）: the Second World War had not yet ended, and frictions between the United States and the Soviet Union were already growing.

As recently as late last year, （）reports circulating among US and other international officials cited numerous Greek security flaws during counter-terrorism exercises conducted last August.

The result would be higher-cost imports that would represent a tax on the American consumers - a tax that would （） purchasing power and would undoubtedly constrain US economic growth.

How to Reduce Corruption in Civil Government? Your writing should be based on the outline given below:(1) List some signs of government corruption;(2) State the seriousness of phenomenon;(3) The measures (steps) taken to combat them.

There are at least two ways of talking about contemporary cosmopolitan cultures. The first is to suggest that cosmopolitan cultures are the depthless commercial pleasures of the increasingly placeless capitalist elite. In this view, cosmopolitan culture is aligned with a postmodern culture that involves the visual and sensual pleasures of global cities. Hollywood cinema, Madonna CDs and Australian wine. This builds upon a prejudice of certain aspects of left thinking that presumes that if one moves outside the boundaries of the nation it is to ‘wallow in a privileged and irresponsible detachment’. Such a notion of cosmopolitanism would tie a fast-moving placeless culture into the rise of a new middle and upper class of cappuccino drinkers. Here cosmopolitanism can be contrasted with the more local and national cultural definitions that are available to poor and working people. Such a view sets up a simple contrast between cosmopolitans and locals. Cosmopolitanism, on such a view, becomes the everyday currency of global capitalism, whose most obvious effect is the reinforcement of symbolic boundaries between social classes.However, the second version of cosmopolitanism has a more overtly ethical vision than one motivated by the reproduction of class prejudice. Such a notion of cosmopolitanism would not presume that the globe-trotting journalists are any more cosmopolitan in their orientations than someone who has never left the city of their birth. This is because to conceive of cosmopolitanism ethically detaches it from my ability to access exotic forms of consumption, while connecting it from my ability to live with different. While cosmopolitanism can indeed be connected to forms of cultural openness, it is more closely connected to what Jonathan Rutherford has called “the art of life” than to manic mobility or hedonism.The version of cosmopolitanism I wish to defend has more to do with ethics and selfhood than explicit concerns with ideology. However, it does retain a sociological point of reference through the many new claims and agendas that are being opened by questions connected to the mobility of cultures, multiculturalism, gender and sexuality. Yet there are a number of skeptics in this regard. For example, Friedman has argued that intellectuals and elites who wish to talk of hybridity and cosmopolitanism are largely writing from the ‘particular’ viewpoint of ‘de-territorialized’ identities. The hybridity and cultural sophistication of elite groups is in sharp distinction to the processes of Balkanization and trivialization experienced at the bottom of the system. Friedman makes these points against cultural theorists like Bhabha, whose work seeks to emphasize how all forms of cultural and symbolic production lack the primordial unity or fixity claimed by cultural nationalists. Friedman’s view is that this insight is likely to be of little help when faced with nationalist forms of cultural closure and violence. However, Bhabha does point to a connection between questions of identity and ethics missed by Friedman. What Bhabha describes as the uncovering of the ‘contestation and flux’ of identity has contributed to the cosmopolitan project. Many post-colonial writers in this respect point to the partial blindness of national habits and traditions, which see only what they want to see. The discursive sin of arguments made in respect of hybridity is to point to the way common identities (not just elites) are forged through the unpredictable flows of peoples and symbols.

In my view, such a mechanical prediction misses the mark. For one thing, countries sometimes react to the rise of a single power by “bandwagoning”, much as Mussolini did when he decided to ally with Hitler. Proximity to and perceptions of threat also affect the way in which countries react. The United States benefits from its geographical separation from Europe and Asia in that it often appears as a less proximate threat than neighboring countries inside those regions. Indeed, in 1945, the Unites States was by far the strongest nation on earth, and a mechanical application of balancing theory would have predicted an alliance against it. Instead, Europe and Japan allied with the Americans because the Soviet Union, while weaker in overall power, posed a greater military threat because of its geographical proximity and its lingering revolutionary ambitions. Today, Iraq and Iran both dislike the United States and might be expected to work together to balance American power in the Persian Gulf, but they worry even more about each other. Nationalism can also complicate predictions. For example, if North Korea and South Korea are reunited, they should have a strong incentive to maintain an alliance with a distant power such as the United States in order to balance their two giant neighbors, China and Japan. But intense nationalism resulting in opposition to an American presence could change this if American diplomacy is heavy-headed. Non-state actors can also have an effect, as witnessed by the way cooperation against terrorists changed some states’ behavior after September 2001.A good case can be made that inequality of power can be a source of peace and stability. No matter how power is measured, some theorists argue, an equal distribution of power among major states has been relatively rare in history, and efforts to maintain a balance have often led to war. On the other hand, inequality of power has often led to peace and stability because there was little point in declaring war on a dominant state. The political scientist Robert Gilpin has argued that “Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, like the Pax Ronuina, ensured an international system of relative peace and security.” And the economist Charles Kindleberger claimed that “for the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer.” Global governance requires a large state to take the lead. But how much and what kind of inequality of power is necessary-or tolerable-and for how long? If the leading country defines its interests narrowly and uses its weight arrogantly, it increases the incentives for others to coordinate to escape its hegemony.Some countries chafe under the weight of American power more than others. Hegemony is sometimes used as a term of opprobrium by political leaders in countries such as Russia. The term is used less often or less negatively in countries where American soft power is strong. If hegemony means being able to dictate, or at least dominate, the rules and arrangements by which international relations are conducted, then the United States is hardly a hegemony today. It does have a predominant voice and vote in the IMF, but it cannot alone choose the director. It has not been able to prevail over Europe and Japan in the WTO. It opposed the Land Mines Treaty but could not prevent it from coming into existence.

Davos 2013 is shaping up to be the year when the forum’s bank participants try to fade into the background and finally put the financial crisis behind them. Public panels include only two or three devoted to financial services. At the more productive private meetings at the fringes, bankers say discussion is more upbeat than it has-been since the crisis began half a decade ago. Improving eurozone sentiment and a slowly brightening mood among banks’ corporate clients is heartening for bankers. All the same no one can let go of the topic that has most vexed them for years: ever-increasing regulation.On the core eurozone discussion, the tone is of cautious optimism. “The system is slowly coming back to life,” said one investment bank boss, pointing to steady signs of eurozone recovery, most recently evident in this week’s Spanish sovereign debt auction. “There’s definitely a change of tone,” added the board member of a US bank. “Our clients are definitely more upbeat.” Around that average sentiment views ranged widely, stretching from the complacent to the doom laden. “It’s hard to see what could go wrong,” said one investment bank boss. That was in stark contrast with a warning from Axel Weber, chairman of UBS and former president of Germany’s Bundesbank, who said that patchwork fixes by central banks were just disguising problems that will return. “We’re Jiving a better life now at the expense of future generations,” Mr. Weber said.As at recent Davos forums, the regulatory agenda has provided a focus. Bankers this year have bemoaned the breakdown in an international regulatory framework. Mr. Weber said: “You need a global standard. But this is not happening.” He warned that, without a harmonized rule book, the dangers in the global banking system would increase. He contrasted the “Alpine” capital requirements in Switzerland with the diverse structural reforms under way in the US, the UK and potentially the EU.Worse still was the failure of policy makers to look across the financial services industry and join up the thinking on how banks and insurers should be regulated, critics said. One chief executive of a large US financial group said the regulatory situation was “really horrific”. “If you take a nice business like the insurance business,” the chief executive said. “Here’s an industry that went through the crisis and had almost no problems. They’ve put in a whole new regulatory regime to make sure they can’t make money. It’s astonishing.” Another bank boss said privately he was “extremely worried” about the inability of European insurance companies to finance banks, under the prospective Solvency II rules. Tidjane Thiam, chief executive of UK insurer Prudential, said: “There is a lack of joined-up thinking. The insurance industry is traditionally the biggest investor in the banking industry but Solvency II says we can’t invest in banks.”Friction was also evident between investors and companies, particularly financial groups. Paul Singer, head of Elliott Capital Management, slammed banks for “completely opaque” disclosures that made it impossible to know whether they were “risky or sound”. Most pernicious of all among the regulatory initiatives was the continuing - and arguably worsening -sense of uncertainty over what regulators and politicians have in mind next, particularly in Europe.1.How would you characterize the atmosphere at Davos forums 2013?2.Axel Weber would most probably argue that（）.3.It may be inferred from the passage that （）.4.The regulatory situation is in a bad shape in that （）.5."Completely opaque disclosures” in the last paragraph refers to the fact that （）.

In 1871 the Paris Commune which, as mentioned, was the first socialist revolution, was also the last one to take place in a country that was part of the capitalist center. The twentieth century inaugurated— with the “awakening of the peoples of the peripheries” — a new chapter in history. Its first manifestations were the revolutions in Iran (1907), in Mexico (1910-1920), China (1911) and “semi-peripheral” Russia in 1905. This awakening of the peoples and nations of the periphery was carried forward in the Revolution of 1917, the Arabo-Muslim Nahda, the constitution of the Young Turk movement (1908), the Egyptian Revolution of 1919, and the formation of the Indian Congress (1885).In reaction to the first long crisis of historical capitalism (1875-1950), the peoples of the periphery began to liberate themselves around 1914-1917, mobilizing themselves under the flags of socialism (Russia, China, Vietnam, Cuba) or of national liberation (India, Algeria) associated to different degrees with progressive social reforms. They took the path to industrialization, hitherto forbidden by the domination of the old imperialism, forcing the latter to “adjust” to this first wave of independent initiatives of the peoples, nations, and states of the peripheries. From 1917 to the time when the “Bandung project” (1955-1980) ran out of steam and Sovietism collapsed in 1990, these were the initiatives that dominated the scene.I do not see the two long crises of aging monopoly capitalism in terms of long Kondratieff cycles, but as two stages in both the decline of historical globalized capitalism and the possible transition to socialism. Nor do I see the 1914-1945 period exclusively as “the 30 years” war for the succession to “British hegemony.”I see this period also as the long war conducted by the imperialist centers against the first awakening of the peripheries (East and South).This first wave of the awakening of the peoples of the periphery wore out for many reasons, including its own internal limitations and contradictions, and imperialism’s success in finding new ways of dominating the world system (through the control of technological invention, access to resources, the globalized financial system, communication and information technology, weapons of mass destruction).Nevertheless, capitalism underwent a second long crisis that began in the 1970s, exactly one hundred years after the first one. The reactions of capital to this crisis were the same as it had had to the previous one: reinforced concentration, which gave rise to generalized monopoly capitalism, globalization (“liberal”), and fractionalization. But the moment of triumph-the second “belle époque,” from 1990 to 2008, echoing the first “belle époque,” from 1890 to 1914-of the new collective imperialism of the Triad (the United States, Europe, and Japan) was indeed brief. A new epoch of chaos, wars, and revolutions emerged. In this situation, the second wave of the awakening of the nations of the periphery (which had already started) now refused to allow the collective imperialism of the Triad to maintain its dominant positions, other than through the military control of the planet.1. Which of the following is NOT mentioned as revolution in the passage?2. The word “Kondratieff cycles” in the third paragraph most probably refers to _______.3. How do the peoples, nations, and states of the peripheries force the historical capitalism to “adjust” to their first wave of independent initiatives?4. Which of the following can best explain the idea of last sentence of the passage?5. Which of the following statements can best explain the main idea of the passage?

Classics is a subject that exists in that gap between us and the world of the Greeks and Romans. The questions raised by Classics are the questions raised by our distance from “their” world and at the same time by our closeness to it, and by its familiarity to us in our museums, in our literature, languages, culture, and ways of thinking. The aim of Classics is not only to discover or uncover the ancient world (though that is part of it, as the rediscovery of Bassae). Its aim is also to define and debate our relationship to that world. This book will explore that relationship, and its history, starting from a spectacle that is familiar, but, at the same time, can become puzzling and strange: dismembered fragments of an ancient Greek temple put on show in the British Museum. In Latin the word “museum” once indicated; a temple of the Muses’; in what respects is the modern museum the right place to preserve treasures from a classical temple? Does it only look the part?The issues raised by Bassae provide a model for understanding Classics in its widest sense. Of course, Classics is about more than the physical remains, the architecture, sculpture and painting, of ancient Greece and Rome. It is also about the poetry, philosophy, science and history written in the ancient world and still read and debated as part of our culture. But here too, essentially similar issues are at stake, questions about how we are to read literature which has a history of more than 2,000 years, written in a society very distant and different from our own.To read Plato’s writings on philosophical topics, for example, involves facing that difference, and trying to understand a society, the ancient Greece, in which writing came not in printed books but on papyrus rolls, each one copied by the hand of a slave; and in which “philosophy” was still thought of as an activity that went on in the open air life of the city, and was part of a social world of drinking and dinner. Even when philosophy became a subject for study in lecture and classroom, in its own right, it remained a very different business from our own academic tradition - for all that Plato’s school was the original “Academy” named after a suburb of Athens.On the other hand, remote or not, to read Plato is also to lead philosophy that belongs to us, not just to them. Plato is still the most commonly read philosopher in the world; and as we read him now, we inevitably read him as part of “our” philosophical tradition, in the light of all those philosophers who have come since, who themselves had read Plato.Every survival from the classical world is, of course, unique. At the same time, as this book will show, there are problems, stories, questions, significances that all those survivals hold in common; there is a place in “our” cultural story that they (and only they) share. That, and reflection on that, amounts to Classics.1. According to the passage, which of the following can be inferred about Classics?2. According to the passage, which of the following is NOT true of Plato?3. The word “them” in paragraph 4 refers to ____.4. The passage is most likely a part of _.5. The title that best expresses the idea of the passage is ____.

Why pick up what literary history so resolutely discards? Any study of bestsellers confronts the same question as does the decaf, no-fat latte drinker in Starbucks: “why bother?” One justification, and the easiest demonstrated, is their interesting peculiarity. Like other ephemera of past times, bestsellers offer the charm of antiquarian quaintness. And so short is their lifespan, that today’s bestsellers become yesterday’s fiction almost as soon as one has read them.Looking back through the lists is to uncover delightful cultural oddities. Consider, for example, the top-selling novel of 1923 in the United States, Black Oxen, by Gertrude Atherton. Recall too that the discriminating reader of that year had James Joyce’s Ulysses and T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land to choose from.The allusion of Atherton’s title signals grand literary pretension; pretension absurdly unmerited. None the less, the novel’s theme was, for the time, both topical and sensational-rejuvenation. For humans, that is, not cattle.The narrative opens in a New York theatre. A brilliant young newspaperman, Lee Clavering, is struck by a beautiful woman in the audience. Investigation reveals that she is facially identical with a young ‘belle’ of thirty years before, Mary Ogden. Miss Ogden married a Hungarian diplomat, Count Zattiany, and has never been heard of since. Speculation rages, but eventually the truth comes out: Ogden/Zattiany has been rejuvenated in Vienna by Dr Steinach’s new X-ray technique. By bombarding a woman’s ovaries at the period of menopause, the ageing process is reversible.When news of the wonderful process hits the newspapers, “civil war threatens”. And luckless Clavering finds himself in love with a woman old enough to be his mother. On the other side, he himself is obsessively loved by a flapper, Janet, young enough to be his daughter, who drinks illegal hooch and attends “petting parties”. The plot thickens, madly thereafter. It is nonsense-just as, medically, Stcinach’s X-ray miracle was nonsense. In 1922 Atherton herself had received the Viennese doctor’s rejuvenation treatment. It seems, from publicity pictures, to have done little for her beauty. But tosh fiction and quack science as it may be, Black Oxen fits, hand-in-glove, with its period. And no other period.However absurd it seems to the modern reader, Atherton’s novel reflects, and dramatizes, contemporary anxiety about women’s freedoms. The 1920s was the era of the “flapper” —the perpetually young girl-woman. British women in this decade had, after long struggle, the vote -but only if they were over 30, after which the heyday in the female blood was conceived to have been sufficiently cooled to make rational political decisions.Black Oxen, the top novel in the US in 1923, is inextricably of its period. It could have been published 15 years later. But out of its immediate time-and-place frame, Black Oxen would have no more “worked” than a fish out of water. Nor would it, in other days, have been what it was, “the book of the day”. The day made the book, as much as events of the day made newspaper headlines in 1923. This hand-in-glove quality is inextricably linked with the ephemerality of bestsellerism.1.Why does the author mention Ulysses and The Waste Land in paragraph 2?2.According to the passage, all of the following are true about Black Oxen EXCEPT （）.3.The word “rage” in the passage is closest in meaning to （）.4.Which of the following sentence can best express the meaning of the highlighted sentence in the Last paragraph?5.According to the passage, which of the following is true about a bestseller?

Broadly speaking, I （1）the experience of would-be public intellectuals into two forms. In the period of the 1960s and 1970s, those working for social justice （2）intellectual work against the background of a ‘world under construction’- thought and action remained allied and the link to policy remained （3） for intellectuals to move beyond mere word games. In the 1980s and early 1990s, those intellectuals working for social justice in education faced a ‘world under deconstruction’ - many of （4）projects were dismantled or came under sustained attack. In this later period, detached from action and divorced from policy, the public intellectual was forced into an increasingly abstract position of arguing through words for policies and activities that （5） discourses of disavowal, displacement and derision. This is harsh terrain to occupy and yet there are many examples of people who continued to （6）social justices in race, gender and class terms. I am reminded of a film I watched on the American Civil War. As the South was progressively defeated, （7） land was occupied -just a few towns and strips of land. In the end, the commentator said all that was left was a ‘confederacy of the mind’-a collective memory of an aspiration. （8）, that has been the fate of movements for social justice and of associated intellectual work （9） the past two decades. But we should not underestimate the ‘confederacy of the mind’. For one （10） I will make with great force is that the largest problem the attempted reconstruction of the past two decades（11）-the attempt to demolish the welfare state - is people’s collective memory of good public services, of commitments to provision for all,（12） it be schools or hospitals. The vital task now is to （13）, reenergize and reinvent new projects and programs for social justice, for memories and predisposition in Britain remain（14） resilient. We should now be （15） define a new role for the educational researcher in （16） Britain, and do so in ways informed by collective memories of social justice initiatives. This should, hopefully, presage a new investigation of the role of educational researcher as public intellectual, moving us （17） a new phase after the hopeful years of the 1960s and early 1970s and the reversal in the two decades that followed. Now we can hope again there are postmodern prospects （18） I should note that I am not （19） re-establishing some old master narrative of social justice - more （20） voices and visions, a moving mosaic of intentions and plans.

The audience cheered as Number three had rowed himself out and was slumped over his oar at the （）.

Examine the data over time, and you’ll find irrefutable evidence of progress: the decline of war, the increase in life span; （） of literacy, democracy, and equal rights; （） of privilege based on race, gender, heredity and beliefs.

He was the king of farce and the most influential neoclassical playwright. His characters were used to （） real people, and he was interested in showing the reality of human weakness as much as possible.

If no acquisition was cognized as rightful even in a provisional way （） entering the civil condition, the civil condition itself would be impossible.

Their solution was to enroll their children in private schools, which, because they received no tax money, were free to operate without being subject to racial （）.

Hope helps. It keeps us going in bleak times and amid （） news. But hope has more credibility when we can point to the reason for it.

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